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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's 
February 18, 1992 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Review 
alleging entitlement to permanent, total disability benefits 
sustained as a result of an industrial accident. A Petition for 
Review of that Order was timely filed with this Court on March 17, 
1992. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 35-
1-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There are three substantial issues presented for review: 
(1) whether Mr. Willardson suffered a compensable industrial 
accident; 
(2) whether the Administrative Law Judge applied the wrong 
standard of proof to Petitioner's injuries; and, 
(3) whether the Industrial Commission abused its discretion 
by failing to convene a Medical Panel. 
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the 
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of 
error", since they involve questions of law, and no deference to 
the agency's view of the law is required. Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d) 
(1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 
1 
1991)• Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope 
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize 
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to 
compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. State 
Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 
1984). McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 
1977) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77(1) (a) (1988) is the 
determinative statute in this case. Rule 490-1-9 of the Industrial 
Commission's administrative rules is also applicable. They are set 
forth in full in the Addendum thereto as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Willardson seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order 
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to 
permanent, total disability compensation occasioned by his 
industrial accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Willardson filed an application for permanent, total 
disability compensation benefits sustained as the result of an 
industrial injury on or about April 15, 1988. (R. at 8). None of 
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the parties disputed that Mr. Willardson is disabled (R. at 10, 
74); however, the Respondents alleged that Mr. Willardson did not 
sustain a compensable industrial injury and is thus not entitled to 
permanent, total disability benefits. (R. at 10). A hearing was 
held on February 26, 1991. (R. at 17). 
Disposition Below 
On March 18, 1991 the Administrative Law Judge held that 
Petitioner had failed to demonstrate medical causation and that his 
symptoms and disability after April 15, 1988 were the result of 
pre-existing conditions with no contribution from the work 
activities of April 15, 1988. A Medical Panel was not appointed to 
examine Mr. Willardson or review his medical records. His claim 
for permanent, total disability benefits was dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to establish medical causation. (R. at 19-
28, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit B). 
He filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission 
which was subsequently denied on February 18, 1992. (R. at 74-79, 
copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C) . He challenges that final 
agency action in this Petition for Review. 
Statement of the Facts 
At the time of his industrial accident on April 15, 1988, Mr. 
Willardson was 57 years old and employed by Beaver Creek Coal 
Company as a Belt Supervisor. (R. at 20) . That job involved 
maintaining a conveyor belt that was approximately 1 and 1/2 miles 
long. The belt was mostly waist-high, but was shoulder high for a 
portion of its total length, and was three (3) feet overhead in 
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places. Mr. Willardson's duties required him to keep the belt 
clean, primarily by shoveling under the rollers to keep debris from 
building up. (R. at 20) . 
On April 15, 1988, Mr. Willardson was engaged in "regarding" 
the belt, which involved replacing wire mesh guards that were 
fastened to the belt lengthwise and are designed to prevent rock 
from falling off the belt. He had never previously performed this 
activity. The guards are made of heavy wire mesh and were 
approximately 4 feet by 8 feet in dimension, and weighed 
approximately 20-25 pounds each. They were stacked in packages of 
50 to 100 and bound together with straps. To reguard the belt, the 
guards needed to be carried from the stack over to the belt and 
then fastened to the belt, using wire and pliers. (R. at 21) . 
While attempting to pick up one of the screens from a stack, Mr. 
Willardson found that it was stuck and that he would have to jerk 
it loose. He bent over at the waist and grabbed onto the guard on 
top of the stack and jerked on it while straightening up and 
stepping back at the same time. As he jerked it, pulling it up and 
away from the stack, he felt a sharp pain about at the level of his 
belt line in his low back. (R. at A-l). 
Due to the severity of the pain, he immediately laid down flat 
on his back and was found laying on the ground by another employee, 
Mr. Owen Hunt. Mr. Hunt helped him up and into a shack 
approximately 6 to 8 feet away. When the pain did not subside and 
in fact had increased, Mr. Willardson concluded that he would be 
unable to remain at work. He showered, and with some difficulty, 
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got out of his work clothes and got dressed. Mr. Hunt helped him 
into his (Hunt's) van and drove him to a Chiropractor, Dr. Sanders. 
Dr. Sanders declined to treat him and referred him to the Emery 
medical Center. (R. at 21,22, A-l). 
Mr. Willardson was seen by Dr. C. Kotrady at the Emery Medical 
Center that same day. (R. at 22, A-2) . Dr. Kotrady's Physician's 
Initial Report of Work Injury noted that Mr. Willardson had right 
hip pain in a number of different places, and contained a diagnosis 
of right hip pain, severe degenerative arthritis - hips, peilvis and 
lumbar spine, with degenerative disc disease at all levels of the 
lumbar spine with scoliosis present. (R. A-2 at 11.5). Dr. 
Kotrady indicated that Mr. Willardson7s condition was the result of 
an industrial injury, but noted that there was also evidence of 
degenerative arthritis and disc disease pre-existing this injury. 
(R. A-2 at 11.5). Dr. Kotrady initially felt that Mr. Willardson 
could return to work as of April 25, 1988. (R. A-2 at 11.5). 
When leaving Dr. Kotrady's office on April 19, 1988 for a 
follow up visit, Mr. Willardson "felt something twist and pull in 
his hip and the hip pain reoccurred". He was unable to stand in a 
line at a scout meeting that evening because of worsening pain. 
That pain became markedly worse when he stooped over to take some 
clothes out of the dryer on April 23, 1988. (R. A-4 at 25). 
On April 23, 1988, Mr. Willardson was admitted to Castleview 
Hospital for low back pain. The Admit History and Physical Exam 
report indicates that he had chronic low back pain, but that after 
recovery from a 1970 injury and surgery that he was OK with just 
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occasional low back discomfort and had not experienced any loss of 
work time. (R. A-4 at 25) . He was treated conservatively and 
discharged on April 30, 1988. The Discharge Summary indicates that 
he seemed to improve, but had reached a plateau and still had 
significant pain and discomfort in the hip with minimal ambulatory 
functioning. (R. A-4 at 25). 
Mr. Willardson followed up with Dr. David R. Heiner after 
release from the hospital, and was referred by him to Dr. L. 
Gaufin, a neurologist in Provo, Utah. On May 5, 1988, after an 
initial examination, Dr. Gaufin reported his findings as: (1) acute 
lumbar radiculopathy L4-5, L3-4, right, secondary to degenerative 
disc and joint disease with disc protrusion at L3-4, L4-5, right, 
secondary to degenerative disc and joint disease with disc 
protrusion at L3-4, L4-5, right greater than left and (2) chronic 
osteoarthritis and degenerative disc and joint disease Ll-2, L2-3, 
L3-4, L4-5 L5-S1 bilaterally. Dr. Gaufin noted that the lumbar 
radiculopathy was secondary to the work-related injury on April 15, 
1988. (R. A-6 at 58-59). 
Mr. Willardson continued to be followed up by Dr. Heiner 
approximately every month or two through February 1990. There was 
never any real change in his overall condition or symptoms during 
this period, although routine events would sometimes exacerbate the 
pain causing it to increase in intensity for a period of time. (R. 
A-2 at 48-51) . Mr. Willardson was never able to return to work 
after the industrial injury and was awarded Social Security 
Disability beginning as of April 15, 1988, the date of his 
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industrial accident. (R. A-12). 
Both Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner completed Summary of Medical 
Record reports in September, 1988 and accessed impairment ratings 
for Mr. Willardson. Dr. Heiner gave him a 30% whole person rating, 
with 50% of that being due to pre-existing conditions and 50% due 
to the April 15, 1988 industrial injury. (R. A-5 at 42, 46). Dr. 
Gaufin gave him a 15% whole person rating, with 50% being due to 
pre-existing conditions and 50% due to the April 15, 1988 
industrial injury. (R. A-6 at 60). The Respondents did not have 
Mr. Willardson examined by a physician of their own choosing and 
did not present any contrary medical evidence. The Administrative 
Law Judge did not refer Mr. Willardson to a Medical Panel. 
Petitionees claim for permanent total disability benefits was 
dismissed with prejudice by the Administrative Law Judge on March 
18, 1991 for failure to establish medical causation (R. at 19-28). 
He filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial Commission on 
April 17, 1991 ( R. at 29-31), but it was denied on February 18, 
1992. (R. at 74-79). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S) 
The Petitioner sustained a compensable industrial injury on 
April 15, 1988 while in the employ of Respondent Beaver Creek Coal 
Co. That injury was severe enough to require immediate medical 
treatment and prevent him from being able to return to work after 
that injury. Both of the Doctors who examined and treated Mr. 
Willardson found that he had sustained an industrial injury and 
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that it was responsible for at least half of his resulting 
permanent total disability status. 
The Respondents did not provide any conflicting medical 
testimony or documentation and despite the fact that the disability 
ratings assessed by Petitioner's two doctors varied by more than 
5%, (they actually varied by 15%), the Administrative Law Judge did 
not refer this matter to a Medical Panel. 
This Court should summarily reverse the Industrial 
Commission's determination that Petitioner did not establish 
medical causation and remand with instructions to enter an award 
establishing that fact. In the alternative, this matter should be 
remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene 
a Medical Panel to examine the medical causation issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY 
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS AS TO 
COVERAGE ARE TO BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED 
WORKER. 
Few principles of workers7 compensation law are as well 
established in this State as that workers' compensation disability 
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, 
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor 
of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this 
principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 
796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State v. Industrial Commission, supra., 
J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 661 P.2d 949 (Utah 
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1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 1362 (Utah 1980); 
McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v. Industrial 
Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. Industrial 
Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. Industrial 
Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, discussed the 
proper construction of the Workers7 Compensation Act and the 
underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that 
the statues of this state are to be 'liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice.7 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the 
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be 
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his 
dependents in case death supervenes. The right to 
compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of 
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act 
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or 
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to 
xemployees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the 
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as 
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are 
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs 
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such 
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those 
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or 
death to provide adequate means for the support of those 
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of 
total disability or death of the employee his dependents 
might become the objects of public charity, such a 
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or 
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right 
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such 
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such 
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason, 
if for no other, should receive a very liberal 
9 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are 
all united upon the proposition that in view of the 
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as 
the case may be. Id, at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added) 
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law failed to apply this vital rule of 
construction. Nowhere in her Findings or Conclusions is there any 
evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in 
favor of the claim". Whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in 
the record, the Administrative Law Judge construed it against the 
injured employee which is contrary to the correct statutory 
construction required in a workers compensation case. 
In light of the Administrative Law Judge's casual disregard of 
the findings of the only two Doctors who presented medical 
evidence, the absence of any medical evidence supporting her 
Findings or refuting Petitioner's physicians, the finding of a lack 
of medical causation, for the reasons set forth below, is simply 
not supported by the record. The entire underlying basis of the 
Order is thus flawed. The "findings" and "conclusions" do not 
evidence "humane and beneficent purposes" as required by law. The 
entire Order should be disregarded due to this conceptional flaw. 
II 
THE PETITIONER SUSTAINED AN INJURY BY REASON OF AN 
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT, 
The law is clear and overwhelming that the Workman's 
Compensation Act is to be applied liberally and in favor of 
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awarding benefits, with all doubts as to coverage being resolved in 
favor of the injured worker. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, supra. 
This principle of construction is not only to be applied to the 
application of law, but also to the reasonable inferences which can 
be drawn from the facts. The Petitioner is entitled to have all 
doubts as to whether he sustained a compensable industrial injury 
as a result of the events of April 15, 1988 resolved in his favor. 
The evidence that Petitioner suffered an industrial injury on 
that date was overwhelming and largely unrefuted other than by 
innuendo. The Respondents base their argument that a compensable 
injury did not occur on that date on the Administrative Law Judges 
conclusion that "[Petitioner's] symptoms and disability after April 
15, 1988 were the result of his long-standing and significant 
degenerative condition of his lumbar spine and were not the result 
of any significant contribution by activities of April 15, 1988." 
(R. at 26) . This argument begs the question and fails to apply 
clearly delineated standards as to what constitutes a "compensable 
injury". 
In order to establish that he has suffered a compensable 
injury under the Workers' Compensation Act, the Petitioner need 
only show that the injury must have occurred by accident; and there 
must be a causal connection between the injury and the claimant's 
employment activities. Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Commission. 766 
P.2d 1089, 190 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
In the landmark case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court defined what constitutes an 
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accident under Workers7 Compensation Act. The Court held as 
follows: 
For purpose of worker,s compensation, the key requirement 
of an 'accident' is that the occurrence be unanticipated, 
unplanned and unintended; where either cause of injury or 
result of exertion is different from what would normally 
be expected to occur, occurrence is unplanned, 
unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by 'accident'. Id. 
at 21. 
The Petitioner testified that he suffered an industrial 
accident when he injured himself attempting to pick up a 25-pound 
metal screen. The sudden jerking to free the screen was the 
precipitating event which created the back pain. His version of 
the events was supported by co-workers and was never rebutted by 
Respondents. The evidence is overwhelming that on April 15, 1988, 
Petitioner suffered an industrial accident. 
There is no requirement that the accident result in immediate 
and debilitating injury, only that in cases involving the presence 
of pre-existing conditions that it involve some unusual and 
extraordinary exertion. (Allen, supra.) In this case, as a result 
of an accident, Petitioner indisputably engaged in unusual and 
extraordinary exertion. He did sustain an accident as that term is 
defined in the act. 
Petitioner has admitted that he has "a history of prior back 
injuries and has been undeniably suffering from moderate to severe 
arthritic changes in his lumbar spine and pelvis." (R. at 36). 
However, just because a person suffers a pre-existing condition, he 
or she is not disqualified from obtaining compensation. 
"Compensation is not dependant on the state of an employee's health 
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or his freedom from constitutional weakness or latent temdency." 
Denver v. Hansen, 650 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Colo. App., 1982). The 
clear law of this state is that "the aggravation or lighting up of 
a preexisting disease by an industrial accident is compensable...." 
Powers v. Industrial Commission, 19 Utah 2d 140, 143-44, 427 P.2d 
740, 743 (1967) (quoted with approval in Allen, id.). 
There was no medical evidence offered at the hearing which 
would suggest that Petitioner's injuries were not at least 
partially the result of the industrial accident. In fact, both of 
the examining doctors assigned one-half of the Petitioner's 
injuries to the industrial accident. The Respondents fciiled to 
offer any conflicting medical evidence. The Administrative Law 
Judge simply cannot arbitrarily discount competent, uncontradicted 
evidence indicating that the industrial injury was the cause of 
Petitioner's present permanent, total disability. Kaiser Steel 
Corp. v. Industrial Commission., 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985). Frito-
Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984). 
If there was any failure to find a medical/industrial cause of 
the injuries Petitioner demonstrates, such failure resulted from 
the Administrative Law Judge's failure to empanel a medical panel, 
as argued below. 
The actual Findings of Fact portion of the Order in this 
matter are grossly inadequate and do not meet recent legal 
requirements. Such summary conclusions do not constitute proper 
fact-finding. 
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In the recent case of Adams v. Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), the Court stated as follows: 
While the purported "Findings of Fact written by the 
A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence 
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence 
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a 
finding to truly constitute a "finding of fact," it must 
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred.... 
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible 
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the 
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the 
Commission accepted one version over another. The 
evidence shows several possible configurations and 
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes, 
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual 
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in 
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of 
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact 
occurred. Since we cannot even determine why the 
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly 
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of 
the possible subsidiary findings. The findings are 
therefore inadequate. Id. at 20. 
The Findings made by the Administrative Law Judge are 
deficient in that they fail to address in detail the issue of 
medical causation. The absence of a Medical Panel report makes 
this failure even more glaring. Although none of the parties, 
including the Administrative Law Judge, dispute that Petitioner is 
permanently and totally disabled, the Administrative Law Judge did 
not specify the degree to which that disability was caused by the 
1988 industrial injury. The Administrative Law Judge spends a 
great deal of time discussing Petitioner's prior medical problems, 
but does not make concise findings as to Petitioner's current 
medical condition and the causes for it. This failure was 
undoubtedly compounded by the Administrative Law Judges unwarranted 
refusal to submit the matter to a Medical Panel as complained 
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below, and that failure manifests itself here in inadequate 
findings. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has recently informed this 
Commission that: 
In order for us to meaningfully review the findings of 
the Commission, the findings must be 'sufficiently 
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each 
factual issue was reached.' Action v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Rucker v. DaIton, 598 P.2d 
1336 (Utah 1979)) . .. [T]he failure of an agency to intake 
adequate findings of fact on material issues renders its 
findings 'arbitrary and capricious' unless the evidence 
is 'clear, uncontroverted and capable of only one 
conclusion.' Id. (quoting Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 
233, 236 (Utah 1983)). 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah App. 
1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
The Administrative Law Judge's purported Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order should at a minimum be vacated and a 
new Order entered with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. Failure to 
do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P. 2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 
1989). 
Ill 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD 
OF PROOF TO THE PETITIONER'S INJURIES. 
The Administrative Law Judge based her finding of "no medical 
causation" on the finding that the Petitioner's "symptoms and 
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disability after April 15, 1988 were the result of his long-
standing and significant degenerative condition in his lumbar spine 
and were not the result of any significant contribution by the 
activities of April 15, 1988." (emphasis added) (R. at 26). 
There is no requirement in the Workers' Compensation Act that 
the work-related activities "significantly" contribute to an injury 
in order for a compensable industrial accident to occur. Case law 
is overwhelming that the only requirement is that there be a 
medical and legal relationship between the Petitioner's symptoms 
and work-related activities, significant or otherwise. Ostler v. 
Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 428, 46 P.2d 95 (1934). 
In like regard is Larson, Workman's Compensation Law, Section 
12.26 at 3-480-481: "The relative contribution of the accident and 
the prior disease is not weighed,...." The only requirement is 
that the work-related event be a contributing cause of the injury; 
it not be a significant contribution. Higgins v. Industrial 
Commission. 700 P.2d 704 (Utah 1985). 
Respondents, Beaver Creek and CIGNA, have conceded that the 
Administrative Law Judge erred in the use of "no significant 
contribution" as an evidentiary standard, and allege that she could 
have stopped with a mere negative finding of any contribution. (R. 
at 56). While that may be the case, it is clear that she did not 
find that there was "no contribution" but rather that the 
contribution was not "significant". 
The Administrative Law Judge displayed confusion in the 
invocation of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard. At 
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times the Judge refers to a "preponderance" but at other times she 
seems to require proof by "clear and convincing" evidence. The 
applicable standard is that of "preponderance of the evidence" and 
not "clear and convincing," evidence. Lipman v. Industrial 
Commission. 592 P.2d 616 (Utah 1979). In addition, the 
Administrative Law Judge applied the wrong standard of proof under 
Allen, supra. because the higher burden of proof is inapplicable to 
this case since the risk brought to the work place was incurred by 
working for the same employer as distinguished from any personal 
risk brought to the work place by the Petitioner. Fred Meyer v. 
Industrial Commission. 800 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
And finally, the Administrative Law Judge selectively chose 
only a single day's activities of April 15, 1988 in order to 
determine whether a compensable injury had occurred as opposed to 
reviewing the repetitive cause and cumulative effects of the 
Petitioner's employment history with the same employer over several 
years. Petitioner was entitled to have the entire scope of his 
employment history weighed rather than just one isolated day. 
Stouffer Foods Corp. v. Industrial Commission. 801 P.2d 179 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). Nyrehn v. Industrial Commission, supra. Miera v. 
Industrial Commission. 728 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1986). 
IV 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN NOT 
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL TO ASSIST IN THE 
RESOLUTION OF THE MEDICAL CAUSATION ISSUES. 
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Utah Code Annotatedy Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) reads as 
follows: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by 
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course 
of employment,, and if the employer or its insurance 
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the 
medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed 
by the commission. 
In response to Petitioner's claim that despite requests by 
counsel, the Administrative Law Judge failed and/or refused to 
refer this matter to a medical panel, Respondent Utah Industrial 
Commission in its Order Denying Motion for Review states as 
follows: 
Appointment of a medical panel is within the sound 
discretion of the ALJ as limited by U.C.A. Section 35-1-
77 (1953 as amended), and R490-1-9 (Utah Admin. Code 
1992) . Since there was no credible conflicting medical 
evidence, the ALJ did not err in making her decision not 
to appoint a medical panel. (R. at 107). 
While that argument might have some merit in the initial 
formulation of policy, it has none in the execution of the policy 
presently contained in statute, rules and regulations. Utah 
Industrial Commission Rule R568-1-9 governing the "necessity of 
submitting a case to a medical panel" provided in relevant part as 
follows: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission 
adopts the following guidelines in determining the 
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
18 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000.... See Addendum, Exhibit A. 
The Rule mandatorily requires that a panel "will" be used when 
"one or more significant medical issues may be involved". The rule 
does not, as Respondents seem to suggest, give the Administrative 
Law Judge unbridled discretion to determine the existence of such 
issues, but rather definitively states that "Significant medical 
issues are involved where there are: (a) conflicting medical 
reports of permanent physical impairment which vary more than 5% of 
the whole person...." 
It can not be disputed that this case clearly contains 
conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which 
vary by more than 5% of the whole person. Dr. Gaufin rated the 
Petitioner at 15% impairment of the whole person (R. A-5 at 42, 
46) , while Dr. Heiner indicated that he had a 30% whole person 
rating (R. A-6 at 60), a difference of 15%. Both physicians 
divided the Petitioner's permanent impairment as 50% industrial and 
50% pre-existing. 
It little matters that Respondents do not believe that the 
doctor's ratings are not credible. Indeed, they should be estopped 
from such an argument due to their failure to request their own 
consultative medical examination. The Rule does not Sciy that 
referral will occur only when the Administrative Law Judge finds 
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that there are "credible conflicting medical reports;" rather it 
states that referral will occur when there are "conflicting medical 
reports". (emphasis added). It is, in fact, to determine the 
credibility of the initial medical reports that referrals are 
required to medical panels when there is more than a 5% variance in 
the impairment ratings. 
Respondent CIGNA's attorney in his Answer is correct when he 
states; "Now, I am no doctor..." (R. at 54). Neither is the 
Administrative Law Judge. That is why referral to a medical panel 
in such cases is required and the failure to do so is more than an 
abuse of discretion-it is plain error. See Lipman v. Industrial 
Commission, supra and Schmidt v. Industrial Commission. 617 P.2d 
693 (Utah 1980) interpreting the former Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-77 (1953) which made referrals to medical panels 
mandatory in cases of denied liability. 
Although reference to a medical panel under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) is discretionary, that discretion 
is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory by the Commission's 
own Rules and Regulations (Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9). The failure 
to refer a matter to a Medical Panel when such referral is 
mandatory is plain error. "In some cases, such as where the 
evidence of causal connection between the work-related event and 
the injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer the 
case to a medical panel may be an abuse of discretion." Champion 
Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 
1985). See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co.. 728 P. 2d 1008 (Utah 1986). 
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In this case, the causal connection between the work-related 
injury and the Applicant's permanent, total disability, if not 
clear, was at least uncertain and failure to refer the matter to a 
medical panel was error. The Order Denying Motion for Review 
should at the least be reversed and the matter remanded with 
directions to refer the matter to a medical panel since failure to 
do was in direct conflict with Industrial Commission practice and 
rule. The failure to obtain a Medical Panel opinion resulted in 
the Administrative Law Judge lacking essential and necessary 
information to adjudicate Petitioner's claim. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the 
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its February 18, 1992 
Order dismissing Mr. Willardson's claim for permanent, total 
disability benefits for lack of medical causation. The 
uncontroverted evidence submitted to the Industrial Commission 
supports the finding that he sustained a significant permanent, 
partial impairment due to his 1988 industrial accident, and is 
permanently and totally disabled due to his industrial injury. To 
the extent there is any doubt or confusion as to medical causation, 
it was error for the Administrative Law Judge not to convene a 
medical panel. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court remand 
this case to the Industrial Commission with instructions to either 
award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and medical 
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evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a medical 
panel. 
DATED this 26th day of October, 1092. 
Attorneyjs for Petiitioijer 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 26th day 
of October, 1992 to the following: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Benjamin A. Sims, Esq. 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 South 300 East 
Post Office Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE FUND 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Robert J. Shaugnessy, Esq. 
1800 South West Temple Suite 407 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Kerry L. Willardson 
P.O. Box 209 
Castle Dale, Utah 84513 
File 
(1 original & 7 copies) 
(4 copies) 
(4 copies) 
(4 copies) 
(1 copy) 
VIRS^HTOS DABNEY, HS{ 
A t t o r n e y s f o r R e t i t i o n l e r s 
i 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77(1)(a) (1988) 
Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9. 
EXHIBIT B: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
(March 18, 1991). 
EXHIBIT C; Order Denying Motion for Review (February 18, 1992) . 
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35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical consultants — 
Discretionary authority of commission to refer case — Findings and reports — 
Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. (Last amended 1991) 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by 
accident, or for death, arising out of and in the course of employment, and if 
the employer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may 
refer the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the 
commission. 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to 
an occupational disease is filed with the commission, the commission shall, 
except upon stipulation of all parties, appoint an impartial medical panel. 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more physicians specializing 
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim. 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation 
of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its sole 
discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a full-time 
or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical evidence and 
advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-finding 
responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or 
medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same manner and 
under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may determine 
to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission may 
require. In occupational disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from 
performing work for renumeration or profit, and whether the sole cause of the 
disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, results from the occupation 
al disease and whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged,' 
accelerated, or in any way contributed to the disability or death, and if so, 
the extent in percentage to which the other causes have so contributed. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail with 
return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited in the 
United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insurance 
carrier may file with the commission written objections to the report. If no 
written objections are filed within that period, the report is considered 
admitted in evidence. 
EXHIBIT A 
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of the 
panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by the 
report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding, 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the 
case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, 
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the 
medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants present at the 
hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause shown, the 
commission may order other members of the panel, with or without the chairman 
or the medical director or medical consultants, to be present at the hearing 
for examination and cross-examination. 
(f) The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical 
consultants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be 
considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the 
testimony admitted. 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance before 
the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, (as last 
amended by Chapter 116, Laws of Utah 1988) 
R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a 
case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 
days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting 
to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be 
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report. 
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical 
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a 
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for 
consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured 
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of 
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation 
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a 
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to 
give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be 
non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical 
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance, at the 
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical 
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative 
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 90000895 
KERRY WILLARDSON, 
Applicant, * 
* 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
vs. 
BEAVER CREEK COAL COMPANY/ 
CIGNA and EMPLOYERS REINSURANCE 
FUND, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 26, 
1991 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was pursuant 
to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and was represented by 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney.. 
The defendants were represented by Robert J. 
Shaughnessy, Attorney. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by Erie 
Boorman, Administrator. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability benefits 
related to an April 15, 1988 industrial incident after which the applicant 
experienced back and hip symptoms. The carrier has denied the claim and has 
paid no medical expenses or compensation related to the April 15, 1988 
incident. The carrier and the Employers Reinsurance Fund both stipulate to 
the fact that the applicant is currently in a disabled status. However, the 
carrier and the Fund argue that the applicant did not sustain a compensable 
industrial injury on April 15, 1988 and thus he is not entitled to permanent 
total disability benefits. In addition, the Employers Reinsurance Fund"argues 
that even if he did sustain a compensable industrial injury on April 15, 1988, 
his injury is not the cause of his permanent total disability status. As the 
injury did not cause the disability, the Fund argues the applicant is not 
entitled to permanent total disability benefits related to the injury, As 
precedent for this argument, the Fund cites Large v. Industrial Commission, 
758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). 
EXHIBIT B 
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FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a male who was 57 years old on the date of injury 
and who had a spouse, but no minor children on that date. The applicant was 
employed by Beaver Creek Coal Company on the date of injury, April 15, 1988, 
and held the position of Belt Supervisor at the time. He was earning a wage 
that would entitle him to the maximum rate for workers compensation benefits. 
The April 15, 1988 industrial event was not the first time the applicant 
experienced symptoms related to his back, and in the interest of giving a 
chronological overview, the prior back related problems will be summarized 
first. 
The first back injury noted in the medical records submitted at 
hearing is a December 9, 1970 industrial injury that the applicant sustained 
while he was working for the Mid-Continent. Coal Company in Carbondale, 
Colorado. The only description of that injury in the medical records 
indicates that the applicant stooped over to pick up a shuttle car cable and 
felt a catch in his back. The applicant apparently was unable to straighten 
up after this incident. On August 31, 1971, the applicant underwent back 
surgery at St. Luke's Hospital in Denver, Colorado. Actual hospital records 
are not included in the medical record exhibit, but a later letter of the 
treating surgeon. Dr. W. Gerber, indicates that the procedure performed was a 
lumbar laminectomy at L5-S1. Per Dr. Gerber, the surgery was successful in 
eliminating the right leg pain that the applicant experienced following the 
December 9, 1970 injury. The applicant was later rated in 1972 at both 5% and 
7% by different doctors, but it is unclear whether these ratings are the 
equivalent of whole person ratings specified in the AMA Guides to the 
Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. 
The next reference to back problems in the medical record exhibit is 
on July 8, 1983, when the applicant was seen at the Emery Medical Center for 
back pain, bilateral shoulder pain and left hip pain. X-rays were taken of 
the cervical and lumbar spine and were read to show as follows: Cervical spine 
- mostly normal with some question of osteoarthritic changes and compromise of 
the neuro foramina at C3-4; Lumbar spine - severe degenerative osteoarthritis 
of the lumbar spine with multi-level degenerative disc disease and scoliosis. 
The diagnosis of the examining physician was: severe osteoarthritis and 
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine. It is unclear what treatment 
the applicant had at that time and what follow-up occurred. 
On January 16, 1988, per records of Dr. D. Faust, D. C , the 
applicant was at home hanging a ceiling fan when the ladder he was standing on 
collapsed and he fell as a result. The applicant testified at hearing that he 
was not really sure how he landed in this fall, but he believes he fell onto 
his shoulder. Dr. Faust's diagnosis was thoraco-cervical strain/sprain, grade 
II disc syndrome C5-6 with brachial extension neuralgia of the right shoulder 
and arm as a direct complication. The applicant was treated 8 times in 
January 1988, 7 times in February 1988 and 4 times in March 1988 by Dr. 
Faust, The applicant testified at hearing that Dr. Faust only treated his 
neck and shoulder and did not treat his low back. 
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The next incident noted in the medical records is the April 15, 1988 
industrial event at issue. As noted above, the applicant was employed with 
Beaver Creek Coal Company on that date as a Belt Supervisor. This position 
involved maintaining a conveyor belt that was approximately 1 and 1/2 miles 
long. The belt was about waist-high for most of its length, but was shoulder 
height for a portion of its total length, and was 3 feet overhead in places. 
The applicant needed to keep the belt clean and this required shoveling under 
the rollers to keep debris from building up. He normally worked 4 10-hour 
days a week and overtime was normally involved. On April 15, 1988, the 
applicant was engaged in replacing wire mesh guards that were fastened to the 
belt lengthwise, apparently to prevent rock running along the belt from 
falling off the belt. The guards were made of heavy wire mesh and were 
approximately 4 feet by 8 feet in dimension. The applicant estimated that the 
guards weighed about 20-25 pounds each. They were stacked in packages of 50 
to 100 and bound together with straps. To reguard the belt, the guards needed 
to be carried from the stack over to the belt and then had to be fastened to 
the belt, apparently using wire and pliers. The applicant had been doing this 
job for 2 or 3 days as of April 15, 1988. He testified that he had no 
problems with the job until April 15, 1988. He indicated that he had never 
done the task before during his 2 to 3 years working on the belt, but that he 
did hang chain link guarding on the belt at one time. The applicant stated 
that he felt hanging the chain link was easier than the wire mesh. 
The applicant had hung about 14 or 15 guards around mid-day on April 
15, 1988. He estimated that it took from 5 to 15 minutes to hang a guard. 
The applicant testified that he initially felt sharp back pain around mid-day 
on April 15, 1988 when he was trying to free one of the guards from the stack 
on the ground. The applicant explained that the guards were pressed together 
in the stacks as a result of being bound by the straps. This caused the 
guards to catch on each other, and to loosen the guard on the top of the 
stack, the applicant needed to jerk at it to uncatch it. The applicant bent 
over at the waist and grabbed onto the guard on top of the stack (apparently 
with both hands) and jerked on it while straightening up and stepping back at 
the same time. As he jerked it, pulling it up and away from the stack, he 
felt a sharp pain about at the level of his belt in his low back. 
The applicant did manage to free the guard and he dragged it over to 
fasten it to the belt. After doing so, the applicant testified that he felt 
he needed to lay down and he did so flat on his back. This helped somewhat. 
Per the applicant, another employee was there at the time. This was Owen 
Hunt. The applicant stated that he did not immediately tell Hunt that he had 
hurt his back, because he was in such pain at the time. At some point. Hunt 
noticed the applicant laying down on the ground and, per the applicant. Hunt 
helped him to his feet and into the tipple shack that was 6 or 8 feet away. 
The applicant testified that he sat down on a metal tool box for about 10 
minutes with the pain in his right hip and back increasing at this point. The 
applicant then decided to lay down again and he laid down on a bench for about 
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one hour. He finally decided he could not remain at work and he showered, 
with some difficulty getting out of his clothes. The applicant testified that 
Hunt helped him into Hunt's van and Hunt drove him to the home of a 
chiropractor. Dr. Sanders. When he arrived there. Dr. Sanders did not provide 
any treatment and just referred him to the Emery Medical Center. 
The applicant saw Dr. K. Kotrady at the Emery Medical Center the same 
day. Dr. Kotrady*s Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury indicates that 
the injury occurred when the applicant was working and climbing up and down on 
the drive, stretching and twisting, re-guarding the drive. The pain he 
noticed is listed as hip pain. Low back pain and hip pain is listed in the 
complaints section, however, the section regarding the findings of the 
examination indicates that the applicant had right hip pain in a number of 
different positions, but that there was no back pain. An X-ray was taken and 
was read by Dr. Kotrady to show: moderate to severe arthritic changes 
involving lumbar spine and pelvis, multiple levels of osteophyte formation 
with bridging across the discs, significant scoliosis beginning at L3, disc 
space narrowing between Ll-2, L2-3, L3-4 and L4-5, facet sclerosis at these 
levels as well, large osteophyte seen almost bridging between L5 and sacrum 
and evidence of arthritic wear involving both hip joints. There is a final 
note stating "I can determine no acute changes" (emphasis added). 
Dr. Kotrady1s diagnosis was: right hip pain, severe degenerative 
arthritis hips, pelvis and lumbar spine, degenerative disc disease all levels 
of the lumbar spine and scoliosis. Answering the question "Is condition 
requiring treatment the result of the industrial injury or exposure 
described?". Dr. Kotrady has marked both the yes and the no box and refers to 
the comments section for explanation. The explanation states: degenerative 
arthritis and disc disease pre-existed this injury - X-ray evidence in 1983. 
In Dr. Kotrady's office note of the same date, he notes that he felt the 
applicant had compensated for his bad back by shifting the weight to his hips 
and that the hip pain the applicant, was experiencing was secondary to 
arthritis in the hips. That note also states that Dr. Kotrady found no 
evidence of back pain in his examination. He prescribed bed rest, heat/ice, 
robaxin and apparently provided an injection of demerol/phenergan. Dr. 
Kotrady's follow-up note on April 19, 1988, indicates that the applicant's 
right hip pain was a little better and that there was no back pain and full 
range of motion in the back. His assessment on that date was: ligamentous 
strain right hip, no back involvement. He indicates that the applicant could 
return to work as of April 25, 1988. 
The applicant was admitted to Castleview Hospital on April 23, 1988 
for low back pain. The Admit History and Physical Exam report indicates that 
the applicant had a chronic low back pain history. After recovery from the 
1970 injury and surgery, the report indicates that the applicant was OK with 
just occasional low back discomfort and no loss of work time resulting. The 
applicant confirmed this at hearing and stated that he would have back pain 
during those years only after doing a lot of bending. The Admit History 
Report 
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indicates that the applicant was injured on April 15, 1988 climbing up and 
down a drive using long steps. It notes that the applicant made a step and 
twisted and felt pain in the right hip. The report states that the applicant 
was feeling better, but when leaving Dr. Kotrady's office on April 19, 1988, 
he simply turned and felt something twist and pull in his hip and the hip pain 
reoccurred. Also indicated is the applicant's inability to stand in line at a 
scout meeting that night because of worsened pain. Then it is noted that the 
applicant's pain became markedly worse when he stooped to take something out 
of the dryer on April 23, 1988. The applicant's complaints were noted as 
mostly hip pain radiating into the groin, but also back pain. Right leg pain 
that was noticed just after the industrial event had resolved per the Admit 
Report. 
A CT scan of the lumbar spine was taken on April 27, 1988 during the 
applicant's stay in the hospital. It was read to show multi-level 
degenerative and osteoarthritic changes in the lumbar spine, with some 
indication of a possible herniation at L3-4. The applicant was treated 
conservatively at the hospital and the April 30, 1988 discharge summary 
indicates that the applicant seemed to improve, but reached a plateau and 
still had significant pain and discomfort in the hip with minimal ambulatory 
functioning. The applicant followed up with Dr. D. Heiner in Castledale, Utah 
after release from the hospital and Dr. Heiner apparently referred the 
applicant to neurologist. Dr. L. Gaufin in Salt Lake City for a specialist 
opinion. On May 5, 1988, Dr. Gaufin wrote Dr. Heiner explaining his findings 
after the initial examination. Dr. Gaufin's letter describes the injury to 
have occurred when the applicant was re-guarding a belt drive for about 5 
hours, climbing 8 to 10 feet and reaching and stretching. Right hip pain and 
severe right leg pain resulted per Dr. Gaufin. Dr. Gaufin's impression was: 
1) acute lumbar radiculopathy L4-5, L3-4, right, secondary to degenerative 
disc and joint disease with disc protrusion at L3-4, L4-5, right greater than 
left and 2) chronic osteoarthritis and degenerative disc and joint disease 
Ll-2, L2-3, L3-4, L4-5, L5-S1 bilaterally. Dr. Gaufin comments that the 
lumbar radiculopathy was secondary to the work-related injury on April 15, 
1988. 
After May 1988, Dr. Heiner followed up with the applicant every month 
to two months through at least February of 1990. Dr. Heiner's follow-up notes 
appear to show no real change in the applicant's overall condition and 
symptoms during this time period. There are various incidents mentioned where 
the applicant would exacerbate the pain causing it to increase in intensity 
for a period of time. For the most part, it appears from the notes that the 
pain would return to its normal level eventually. The incidents include 
washing 2 cars in July of 1988, putting up Christmas lights and falling in 
December of 1988, reaching to hand something to his son and a turning/twisting 
episode which required an emergency room visit in March 1989. Dr. Gaufin did 
one other report dated December 21, 1988 which indicates radiation into the 
right and left hip and left leg. That report states that the applicant was 
unable to work in the future because of his severe 
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degenerative process in the lumbar spine. Dr. Gaufin notes in that report 
that the applicant was the same as when he had previous seen him in May of 
1988 and that he would not improve. Dr. Gaufin states that the only goal was 
to reduce the rate at which the applicant's joints wore out and to minimize 
the severe crippling that might take place. 
Both Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner completed Summary of Medical Record 
forms provided to them by counsel for the applicant. They are dated September 
of 1988 and give impairment ratings for the applicant. Dr. Gaufin indicates 
in his form that the applicant had a 15% whole person rating, with 1/2 being 
due to pre-existing conditions and 1/2 due to the April 15, 1988 industrial 
incident. Dr. Heiner indicates in his form that the applicant had a 30% whole 
person rating, with 1/2 being due to pre-existing conditions and 1/2 due to 
the April 15, 1988 industrial injury. The forms are very brief and do not 
contain any explanatory breakdown regarding the ratings. At hearing, the 
defendants argued that the ratings appear to be rather off-hand in simply 
dividing up the pre-existing and industrial impairment 1/2 and 1/2. Counsel 
for the applicant indicated that neither doctor had access to the applicant's 
prior medical records when the ratings were assessed. 
The applicant was questioned by the defendants at hearing regarding 
his report of the industrial injury and his filing of a claim. The defendants 
were concerned in particular that the medical records contain no reference to 
an incident involving jerking on a screen. In addition, the defendants point 
to a form the applicant completed for his attorney in August of 1988 (Exhibit 
A-15). That form describes the injury as "reguarding belt drive with heavy 
wire sheets, stepping up and down high places, stretching and bending.M The 
applicant for the most part indicated he could not remember exactly what he 
told the various doctors regarding how the injury occurred and he could not 
recall whether he had told anyone regarding the incident with the screen. 
Currently, the applicant stated he has low back discomfort, but not 
the sharp pain he had experienced just after the April 15, 1988 work 
incident. He stated the pain will become sharp 3 or 4 times per day and that 
this never occurred prior to the April 15, 1988 incident. He stated that he 
has a dull ache in his right thigh from the hip to the knee that he never had 
to the current intensity before April 15, 1988. He also has a dull hurt in 
his left buttocks that he stated comes and goes constantly and began sometime 
after he came home from the hospital in 1988. He has been taking darvocet, 
soma and prozac since April 15, 1988 and he wears a pelvic brace that Dr. 
Heiner prescribed for him. 
The applicant was awarded Social Security Disability beginning as of 
April 15, 1988 for osteoarthritic lumbar spine and degenerative disc disease. 
He also has received long term disability benefits by way of employer benefit 
package which was effective as of October 16, 1988. The combined benefit from 
the two comes to around $1,400.00 per month. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The Industrial Incident: 
The preponderance of the evidence supports the following description 
of the April 15, 1988 industrial incident: The applicant experienced hip pain 
while re-guarding a belt on April 15, 1988 which involved lifting 20-25 pound 
wire mesh screens or guards, measuring 4 feet by 8 feet, and fastening them to 
the belt. The process involved some climbing, stretching and reaching and 
possibly twisting motions. 
All the medical records include some version of the above-stated 
facts. The April 23, 1988 Castleview Hospital Admit History refers to an 
incident where the applicant made a step and twisted with resulting hip pain. 
This is the only place that description is found. Only the applicant's 
hearing testimony includes mention of jerking on a guard/screen. It is 
difficult to believe that such a definitive incident was never mentioned to 
the physicians just after the incident, or that it was mentioned but never 
noted by any of the physicians in their injury descriptions. In addition, it 
is difficult to believe that the applicant did not even mention the screen 
jerking to his attorney when he completed the form for his attorney in August 
of 1988 (Exhibit A-15). The description listed in that form is much the same 
as the description stated above and much the same as is indicated in the 
medical records. Therefore, the ALJ must dismiss the applicant's testimony 
regarding the screen jerking and adopt the above-stated description of how the 
symptoms began. 
Compensable Industrial Injury: 
Medical Cause: 
It is clear that after April 15, 1988, the applicant began to seek 
medical treatment for symptoms in the hip and back, and to a certain extent, 
in the legs, that he either did not experience before April 15, 1988 or for 
which he did not seek treatment prior to April 15, 1988. It is not clear that 
the events of April 15, 1988 are the cause of those symptoms. Dr. Kotrady, 
the doctor who saw the applicant on April 15, 1988 is clearly of the opinion 
that the applicant's problems were pre-existing. His records put heavy 
emphasis on the hip pain and in several places he definitively states there 
was no back pain. His explanation for the hip pain was arthritis of the hip 
joints, confirmed by X-ray, that he believed was caused by a shifting, of 
weight from the back to the hips as a result of the applicant's bad back. He 
was unable to answer a definitive "yes" to whether the industrial injury 
caused the symptoms he was treating and noted that degenerative disc disease 
and the degenerative arthritis were pre-existing as confirmed in X-rays 
pre-dating April 15, 1988. He read the April 15, 1988 X-rays to show no acute 
changes. All of these things clearly point to the applicant's significant 
pre-existing condition as being the cause of his need for treatment at that 
point with no confirmation of contribution from the work activities of April 
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In addition to Dr. Kotrady's records, there is the Castleview 
Hospital records which do mention a unique version of an incident on April 15, 
1988, but also mention several other incidents occurring after April 15, 1988 
causing either hip or back pain. The hospital diagnoses match those of Dr. 
Kotrady and Dr. Gaufin, in that they refer to extensive degenerative and 
arthritic changes in the entire lumbar spine. No acute herniations or 
fractures are noted and the film readings match almost exactly the film 
readings from 1983. Although Dr. Gaufin and Dr. Heiner both have indicated 
that 1/2 of the applicant's lumbar spine impairment is due to the industrial 
incident on April 15, 1988, the basis of these brief notations on the 
fill-in-the-blank forms they completed for applicant's counsel has to be 
questioned. Dr. Gaufin saw the applicant only twice per the medical records 
and he had no prior records for the applicant to review (per counsel for the 
applicant). His diagnosis of extensive degenerative and arthritic changes 
with no acute changes seems to contradict a finding that 1/2 the applicant's 
impairment is due to the April 15, 1988 activities. Dr. Gaufin also later 
notes that the applicant was unable to work due to the severe degenerative 
process in his lumbar spine. Dr. Heiner also had no prior records to review 
and also gives no explanation regarding how he arrived at the percentages he 
has indicated. 
In conclusion, the preponderance of the medical evidence strongly 
suggests that the applicant's symptoms and disability after April 15, 1988 
were the result of his long-standing and significant degenerative condition in 
his lumbar spine and were not the result of any significant contribution by 
the activities of April 15, 1988. 
Legal Cause: 
This issue need not be addressed as the failure to establish medical 
cause prevents any finding of a compensable industrial injury. Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Merely as commentary, the 
activities of April 15, 1988, as described at the beginning of the Conclusions 
of Law, certainly do not clearly fall into the "unusual exertion" category. 
ORDER: 
IT IT THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's claim for permanent 
total disability benefits associated with the work activities of April 15, 
1988 is dismissed with prejudice for failure to establish a compensable 
industrial injury. 
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The Industrial Commission of Utah (IC) reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant who requests that a review be made of the 
administrative law judge's (ALJ) Order of March 18, 1991 in the 
above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 
35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
There is no question among the parties to this case that 
applicant is disabled. However, the defendants argue that the 
applicant did not sustain a compensable industrial injury. In 
brief, the relevant facts follow. 
On the date of the alleged injury, April 15, 1988, applicant 
was 57 years old, and was employed by the Beaver Creek Coal 
Company. Applicant held the position of belt supervisor. 
Applicant had back problems prior to the April 15, 1988 injury. In 
1970, applicant injured his back while working for the Mid-
Continent Coal Company in Colorado. He had a lumbar laminectomy at 
L5-S1 for his problems in 1971, and he was rated in 1972 at five 
percent and seven percent by different doctors. 
In 1983 X-rays were taken in response to his complaints of 
back pain, bilateral shoulder pain, and left hip pain. The X-rays 
showed the following: Cervical spine was mostly normal with some 
question of osteoarthritic changes and compromise of the neuro-
foramina at C3-4; and severe degenerative osteoarthritis of the 
lumbar spine with multi-level degenerative disc disease and 
scoliosis. 
In 1988 applicant was treated 19 times during a three month 
period after he fell at home while hanging a ceiling fan. The 
diagnosis was thoraco-cervical strain/sprain, grade II disc 
syndrome C5-6 with brachial extension neuralgia of the right 
shoulder and arm as a direct complication. 
On the date of the accident at issue in this case, the 
applicant had been working on a job with the Beaver Creek Coal 
Company for two to three years. He was replacing heavy wire mesh 
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guards on the belt. The guards were used to prevent rock from 
falling off the belt. The guards were four feet by eight feet 
long, weighed approximately 20-25 pounds each, and were stacked in 
bound bundles of 50-100. Applicant had been doing the guard 
replacement for two to three days at the time of the accident. 
On April 15, 1988, applicant had hung about 15 guards that 
day, and while trying to free one of the guards from its stack by 
jerking at it, applicant stated at the hearing that he felt a sharp 
pain in his low back at about belt level. The applicant lay down 
on the ground because of the pain, and another employee assisted 
applicant into a nearby shack. Applicant reclined for about an 
hour after which he showered, and was assisted into the other 
employee's van. Applicant was driven to a chiropractor's home who 
did not provide treatment, but instead referred applicant to the 
Emery Medical Center where applicant was treated. 
The ALJ found by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
April 15, 1988 occurred as follows: "The applicant experienced hip 
pain while re-guarding a belt on April 15, 1988 which involved 
lifting 20-25 pound wire mesh screens or guards, measuring 4 feet 
by 8 feet, and fastening them to the belt. The process involved 
some climbing, stretching and reaching and possibly twisting 
motions." Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, dated 
March 18, 1991, at 7. The ALJ dismissed the applicant's testimony 
that he had jerked the screen since "such a definitive incident was 
never mentioned to the physicians just after the incident...." Id. 
Further, the ALJ concluded that the symptoms and disability 
after April 15, 1988 were the result of applicant's long standing 
and significant degenerative condition in his lumbar spine, and 
were not the result of any significant contribution by the 
activities of April 15, 1988. Since she found no medical cause, 
there was no compensable accident and Allen was not invoked. Allen 
v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
We find that there is substantial evidence to support the 
findings and conclusions of the ALJ in light of the whole record. 
The treating physician on April 15, 1988 was clearly of the opinion 
that the applicant's medical problems were preexisting. That 
physician explained the hip pain as being due to arthritis of the 
hip joints. 
The Castleview Hospital records of April 15, 1988 refer to 
extensive degenerative and arthritic lumbar changes. No fractures 
or acute herniations were found. The film readings from 1988 were 
remarkably similar to those of 1983. No surgery was completed to 
correct any problem allegedly aggravated by the April 15, 1988 
injury. 
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Applicant submitted two fill-in-the-blank documents from 
Doctors7 Heiner and Gaufin. Both doctors had indicated that one-
half of applicant's lumbar spine impairment was caused by the 
industrial accident of April 15, 1988. However, neither doctor had 
applicant's prior records to review. Thus, their conclusions were 
based on incomplete information, and can be discounted. 
The ALJ determined that no medical cause existed based upon 
the lack of probative evidence of a connection with the accident of 
April 15, 1988. Applicant contends that the ALJ erred by not 
appointing a medical panel. Appointment of a medical panel is 
within the sound discretion of the ALJ as limited by U.C.A. Section 
35-1-77 (1953 as amended), and R490-1-9 (Utah Admin. Code 1992). 
Since there was no credible conflicting medical evidence, the ALJ 
did not err in making her decision not to appoint a medical panel. 
Applicant also asserts that the ALJ erred when she stated that 
"Applicant's symptoms and disability after April 15, 1988 were the 
result of his long-standing and significant degenerative condition 
in his lumbar spine* and were not the result of any significant 
contribution by the activities of April 15, 1988." Order of the 
ALJ, at 8. He disputes her use of a standard of "significant 
contribution." However, on the preceding page of her order, the 
ALJ stated that there was "no confirmation of contribution from the 
work activities of April 15, 1988." Id. at 7. Further, the ALJ 
stated that the cause of applicants need for treatment on April 
15, 1988 was his "significant pre-existing condition...." Id. 
Thus, it appears that the ALJ determined that the applicant's 
treatment on April 15, 1988 had nothing to do with his work, and 
resulted entirely from his preexisting condition with no 
contribution from his workplace labor. The use by the ALJ of 
"significant" was therefore surplusage, and she did not use the 
standard alleged by applicant. 
Applicant also alleges that the ALJ looked at only one day's 
activity, and failed to consider the cumulative effects of his 
exertions over many years. The ALJ determined that the applicant's 
rendition of how his alleged injury of April 15, 1988 occurred was 
not credible. There was no support for applicant's rendition in 
the records of his physicians. Thus, applicant did not meet his 
burden. The ALJ considered the previous injuries, and determined 
that applicant's injury was entirely preexisting, and did not occur 
on April 15, 1988. 
It is the opinion of the Commission that the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order of the ALJ are substantially correct 
in law and fact in light of the entire file. 
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ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative lciw judge 
dated March 18, 1991 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 30 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requester shall bear all costs to prepare a transcript of 
the hearing for appeals purposes. 
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